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Abstract 
This paper describes the project of building a micro-macro model for South Africa. The aim is to deal with the 
links between globalisation and poverty or inequality, explaining the effects of trade liberalisation on poverty and 
inequality. The main issue of interest is the effect of international trade on households (especially their income); 
some changes may contribute to reduce poverty while other changes could work against the poor. The approach 
presented in this paper relies on combining a macro-oriented CGE model and a microsimulation model. Combining 
these two models the microeconomic effects (on poverty and inequality) of a macroeconomic policy (trade 
liberalisation) can be analysed. The paper gives details about the microsimulation model and the "top-down" 
approach used to link the microsimulation model and the CGE model. In addition, the methodology discussed is 
applied to South African data and a selection of preliminary results using this approach are presented and discussed. 
The main concern regarding poor households is whether the decrease in real (or nominal) earnings for formal low-
skilled and skilled workers is offset by the upward trend in formal employment levels.  This appears to be the case 
implying a decrease in poverty due to trade liberalisation. Although whites emerge as the main winners, the increase 
in inter-group inequality is more than compensated by the decrease in intra-group inequality.  
 
Résumé 
Ce papier décrit le projet d’élaboration d’un modèle micro-macro pour l'Afrique du Sud. L’objectif est 
d’examiner les liens entre la mondialisation et la pauvreté ou l'inégalité, en expliquant les effets de la libéralisation 
commerciale sur ces deux indicateurs de progrès social. La préoccupation principale concerne l'effet du commerce 
international sur les ménages (particulièrement, leur revenu), certains changements pouvant contribuer à réduire la 
pauvreté, tandis que d'autres étant susceptibles d’aggraver les privations. L'approche présentée dans cet article est 
fondée sue la combinaison d’un modèle CGE orienté-macro, et d’un modèle de micro-simulation. En combinant ces 
deux modèles, les effets micro-économiques (sur la pauvreté et l'inégalité) d'une politique macro-économique 
(libéralisation commerciale) peuvent être analysés. L’étude spécifie le modèle de micro-simulation et l'approche 
"top-down", employés pour relier les modèles de micro-simulation et CGE. En outre, la méthodologie discutée est 
appliquée aux données sud-africaines, et des résultats préliminaires, fondés sur cette approche, sont présentés et 
discutés. Un élément central de l’analyse concernant les ménages pauvres est d’examiner si la diminution des 
revenus réels (ou nominaux) des ouvriers qualifiés ou faiblement qualifiés du secteur formel est compensée par la 
tendance à la hausse de l’emploi formel. L’étude montre que cela semble être le cas, ce qui implique une diminution 
de la pauvreté due à la libéralisation commerciale. Bien que les bénéficiaires principaux soient les «  blancs  », 
l'augmentation de l'inégalité inter-groupes est plus que compensée par la diminution de l'inégalité intra-groupes.  
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to 31 December 2005. Specifically I am grateful to Guyonne Kalb for her assistance and invaluable comments on 
various aspects of this work. The support of the National Research Foundation in providing the two datasets used in 
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This paper aims to deal with the link between globalisation and poverty or inequality 
through simulation of the effects of trade liberalisation on poverty and inequality in South Africa. 
This is achieved by building a micro-macro model for South Africa. 
The main issue of interest is the effect of international trade on households (especially their 
income); some changes may contribute to reduce poverty while other changes could work against 
the poor or the effect may be ambiguous by being beneficial for some groups of poor people but 
not for others. For instance, the removal of tariffs on footwear products is expected to affect the 
workers of this sector negatively while at the same time it is also expected to have a positive 
impact on other households by reducing the cost of their expenditure. Models and empirical 
evaluations are important to assess the real impact of complex changes on poor households. 
However, we are facing a problem since trade liberalisation is mainly a macroeconomic 
phenomenon while poverty and inequality are mainly microeconomic issues. In view of the fact 
that most of the available economic models have either a microeconomic or a macroeconomic 
focus,
3 they do not address the question adequately because they miss the important micro-macro 
links.  
The approach presented in this paper combines a macro-oriented Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model and a microsimulation (MS) model following Robilliard et al. (2001). 
However, this approach is extended by also taking into account the changes in capital returns at 
the household level. This is similar to what has been done in some more complex CGE-MS 
models.
4 Combining these two models the microeconomic effects (on poverty and inequality) of 
a macroeconomic policy (trade liberalisation) can be predicted. 
The second section gives details about the micro-data and the microsimulation model to be 
implemented, focussing on the computation of labour market responses. The third section of the 
paper describes both the macro-data and the CGE model. The fourth section provides details on 
the "top-down" approach used to link the MS model and the CGE model. In addition, the paper 
applies the methodology discussed in the previous sections to South African data. A selection of 
results from the CGE and the MS model are presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, 
conclusions are provided in section 6. 
 
2. Microsimulation  Modelling 
 
Guy Orcutt is known as the originator of microsimulation modelling (see Orcutt 1957, and 
Orcutt et al. 1976). MS modelling allows the analysis of social and economic policies’ impacts, 
not only on the means of the variables of interest but also on their distributions. This particular 
feature derives from one of the main advantages of the MS models: the explicit accounting for 
individual heterogeneity. 
There is a distinction between behavioural and non-behavioural models. The latter are 
designed for the analysis of the “morning after” effects of a policy change; that is, individual 
behaviour is assumed to remain the same as before the change. These models can be useful, for 
example, when looking at the impact on the government budget of some minor changes in the 
                                                 
3 These models include macro models, microsimulation models, multiplier models and computable general 
equilibrium models. 
4 For instance, see the integrated model by Cororaton and Cockburn (2005). 
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income tax rates or the eligibility rules for benefits and subsidies. However, once the changes at 
stake cannot be considered to be of minor importance, the assumption of unchanged behaviour 
becomes difficult to justify. Then, the more complex behavioural MS models are more 
appropriate because this type of model allows individuals to adjust their behaviour in response to 
the simulated policy change. 
  In addition, MS models can be subdivided into static or dynamic models, where static 
models are designed mainly for short-term analysis and dynamic models more for medium- to 
long-term analysis.
5 In a static framework, the size and demographic characteristics of the 
population from the original cross-sectional dataset used in the simulation are fixed. The dynamic 
framework, however, also considers the demographic phenomena that affect the original 
population, such as changes in the mortality and fertility rates or in the time taken out for 
education. 
 
Finally, MS models usually are partial equilibrium models, focussing on the household side 
of the economy. As a result, they miss out on a significant part of the story: the general 
equilibrium effects. When dealing with substantial policy changes, it is essential to take into 
account the macroeconomic effects of these changes since they are likely to influence the 
microeconomic outcomes. 
 
2.1.  Overview of the microeconomic data  
 
The South African MS model is based on two household surveys: the Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) of 2000 and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of September 2000. The 
two surveys can be linked since the IES is based on the same sample of households interviewed 
for the biannual LFS. 
The LFS contains detailed employment data on occupation codes, activity codes and wages 
of workers. It is believed to be more reliable than the IES as far as labour incomes are concerned. 
The IES provides a detailed picture of income and spending of South African households but the 
quality of the data is questionable (see PROVIDE project, 2005). Total income and total 
expenditure differ by more than 30% for almost one quarter of the records and this is only one of 
the inconsistencies pointed out by Van der Berg et al. (2003). Some adjustments were thus 
necessary due to inconsistencies within the IES, but also in order to reconcile both surveys. We 
followed the work done under the PROVIDE project (2005) by the National and Provincial 
Departments of Agriculture, whereby undeclared income and under-declared expenditure is 
added to total income and expenditure and all income and expenditure categories are scaled 
upwards, keeping the patterns of income and expenditure constant. In addition, labour incomes 
from the LFS were used to scale up labour incomes from the IES when the latter were obviously 
underreported.
6
The data are broadly in accordance with Casale et al. (2004) and reveal a national 
unemployment rate of about 30% depending on the definition used. Table 1 includes the 
complete South African population and shows remarkable differences between racial groups. The  
 
                                                 
5 For a detailed literature review on dynamic microsimulation modelling, see O’Donoghue (2001). 
6 For this reason, the mean incomes calculated here are slightly higher than in the Provide project (2005); that is, 
7.7% higher for total household income and 11.2% for total household labour income. Further adjustments were 
necessary, in particular to make incomes from labour consistent at the household and at the individual level (Stata 
do-files are available from the author). 
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Table 1:   Overview of employment (numbers in 1000's) 
   Blacks  Coloureds  Asians  Whites  TOTAL 
Inactive
(a) 22,857 2,425  642 2,107  28,032 
Unemployed  3,356  282 69 99  3,806 
Subsistence agriculture  704  19  1  12  736 
2,935 268  32 122  3,357  Informal workers
(b) 
(Average weekly hours of work)  42.7 41.0 42.4 44.5 42.6 
4,327 1,019  359 1,602 7,307  Formal workers 
(Average weekly hours of work)  47.9 44.8 44.3 45.9 46.9 
TOTAL  34,180 4,013 1,104 3,941  43,238 
Note: (a) Including 652,000 "unspecified" workers (b) Including 948,000 domestic workers. Source: Author's 
calculations from IES 2000 and LFS 2000:2 
 
3.9 million whites account for less than 10% of the total population but for more than 20% of the 
formal workers. 
On the contrary, blacks represent almost 80% of the population but less than 60% of the 
formal workers. Indeed, blacks are overrepresented in all categories except formal workers, 
whereas coloureds, Asians and whites are underrepresented in all categories except formal 
workers. Table 1 also reveals that the level of hours worked is fairly high in South Africa 
averaging around 45 hours per week. It is somewhat lower in the informal sector than in the 
formal sector. In this regard, it is interesting to note the distinct distribution of hours amongst 
racial groups in the formal and the informal sectors. Although whites work longer hours than 
blacks in the informal sector, the opposite is found in the formal sector. This can be explained by 
the different nature of jobs occupied by blacks and whites. 
Table 2 focuses on average incomes, poverty and income distribution. South Africa is well 
known for being one of the most unequal countries along with Brazil and this is confirmed by a 
Gini coefficient as high as 0.67.
7 The recent trend is towards a more unequal income distribution 
even if inter-group inequality has been declining. The explanation is that the gap between rich 
and poor within each group has increased substantially despite very high initial levels. For 
instance, a Gini coefficient of 0.47 for whites is a very high figure for a population with an 
education and occupation profile similar to those observed in rich countries. 
Despite the end of the Apartheid regime in 1994 and the first democratic elections, the 
white average income per capita was still, in 2000, 8 times higher than the black per capita 
income. As a consequence, it is not surprising to observe that poverty concerns almost only 
blacks; they account for more than 95% of all poor and more than 35% of all blacks are poor 
using the international $2/day poverty line. In contrast, poverty is virtually non-existent for 
Asians and whites despite the relatively high incidence of poverty at the national level of 29.2%.
8
 
                                                 
7 This Gini coefficient is computed on per capita disposable incomes. Using household incomes, the Gini coefficient 
is 0.59. Similar values are found in other studies. Simkins (2004) calculates a Gini coefficient on household incomes 
of 0.67 in 2000 and 0.69 in 2001. The Gini estimate by HRSC (2004) is 0.77 (using household incomes) for 2000. 
The World Bank (see http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet), calculates a Gini coefficient, based on per capita 
incomes, of 0.58 in 2000 and the Gini index computed by Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) is also 0.58. 
8 Using the same poverty line, the World Bank (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet) produces an estimate of 
34.1% while Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) estimated a poverty incidence of 34%. Using a poverty line of R250 per 
month per capita, our estimated poverty incidence of 41.7% is close to the 38.6% found by Van der Berg and Louw 
(2003). 
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Table 2:   Overview of incomes, poverty and inequality
(a) 
   Blacks  Coloureds  Asians  Whites  TOTAL 
Income per capita
(b) 6,268 10,695 19,824 48,495 10,874 
Headcount Index (P0)  35.6  10.3  1.1  0.2  29.2 
Poverty Gap Index (P1)  14.0  3.2  0.6  0.07  11.4 
Poverty Severity Index (P2)  7.3  1.4  0.4  0.03  5.9 
Gini  0.59 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.67 
Note: (a) The poverty line is the international $2/day poverty line (R174/month/capita in 2000 prices) (b) Average annual 
disposable income per capita in Rand. Source: Author's calculations from IES 2000 and LFS 2000:2 
 
2.2.  Key characteristics of the model 
 
  The South African MS model is a static MS model allowing for behavioural responses. 
The underlying selection model, which drives the behavioural responses, assigns each individual 
from the working-age population to one of the five labour market categories distinguished in the 
model: inactive, unemployed, subsistence agricultural worker, informal worker and formal 
worker. This model takes the potential earnings in these categories into account. A regression 
model is estimated to predict earnings in each category. 
The model simulates the new labour market choices after changes in individual 
characteristics, such as wages (due to macroeconomic changes as estimated in a CGE model), or 
in the coefficients of the model. The simulation is carried out for all individuals aged between 15 




2.2.1.  The selection model for labour market choices 
 
  A multinomial logit specification is used for the selection model (see Maddala, 1983). 
The model assigns each individual to the sector with the highest associated probability. The 
probabilities are derived from the estimation of an implicit utility function. Therefore, the 
underlying assumption is that each individual chooses the sector with the highest associated 
utility. Equation (1) expresses the utility associated with each of the five labour market choices j 
for an individual i: 
 
Uij = ah(i),j + Zij.Bh(i),j + uij          (1) 
 
  This utility function is defined separately for the four demographic groups considered in 
the model: single women, married women, single men and married men. The demographic group 
to which individual i belongs is indicated by an index function h(i). The utility associated with 
each choice is a linear function of a set of individual characteristics Zij, which includes predicted 
                                                 
9 A few workers aged below 15 years or over 65 years are fixed at the observed labour market category. Likewise, 
652,000 “unspecified” workers, for whom there is no data on occupation and on the sector (formal or informal), are 
also excluded from the model. That these occupation and sector variables are missing is partly due to the fact that, 
for various reasons, some people were observed as workers in the IES but not in the LFS. These workers are also 
excluded from the simulation, and their labour market choices and incomes are fixed at the observed levels. 
Moreover, all recipients of the Old Age and War pension, as well as full-time students aged between 15 and 18 years, 
are excluded from the simulation. 
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net earnings,
10 skill level,
11 age, education, province of residence, race as well as the number and 
age of children if applicable. The utility associated with the first alternative (inactive) is set to 
zero to identify the model. The residual term uij describes the effects of unobserved determinants 
on labour market choices. The intercept ah(i),j is common to all individuals belonging to the same 
demographic group h(i). 
Taking the example of the single women (sw), equation (2) provides an expanded form of 
Zij.Bh(i),j showing some variables of particular interest: 
 
Zij.Bsw,j = SKi.B1sw,j + HSi.B2sw,j + PNEij.B3sw  +   …        (2) 
 
The dummy variables SKi and HSi stand for skilled and high-skilled respectively, and 
indicate the skill level of individual i. The reference category is low-skilled workers. The 
coefficients Bh(i),j of individual characteristics Zij are specific to each demographic group h(i) and 
each labour market choice j. The only exception is the coefficient B3h(i) associated with the 
category-specific predicted net earnings PNEij. That is, the coefficient differs between 
demographic groups but it is the same for all labour market choices (i.e. the same coefficient B3sw 
is used for PNEi,0, PNEi,1…, PNEi,4). The variable PNEij is different from the other variables, 
because it is not constant across the choices. Each choice is associated with a particular 
individual-specific level of earnings. The constant coefficient across labour market choices 
implies that for a given demographic group, the influence of predicted net earnings is the same 
over all labour market choices. The underlying assumption is that individuals, when evaluating 
the utility associated with each of the five choices, take into account the predicted net earnings in 
the same way. This model combines two types of specification: multinomial and conditional logit 
(see Maddala, 1983).
12
An additional feature has been added, which makes the model probabilistic. Following 
Creedy et al. (2002), this means that the model “does not identify a particular (…) [labour market 
choice] for each individual after the policy change, but generates a probability distribution over 
the (…) [labour market choices] used”. This is achieved by drawing, for each individual, a set of 
error terms uij from the extreme value distribution (here 100 error terms are drawn). These error 
terms are drawn in such a way that only those which preserve the observed labour market choice 
as the optimal choice when adding the error term to the deterministic part of the utility function 
(Uij with uij left out) are selected. After a policy change, only the deterministic part of the utility 
function is recomputed. Then, by adding the random error terms, previously drawn, to the 
recomputed deterministic utility components, a probability distribution over the labour market 
choices is generated for each individual. This implies that the model does not assign every 
individual from the sample to one particular labour market choice after the policy change. 
Instead, it gives the individual probabilities of choosing each of the five sectors. Combining this 
information with the sampling weights from the household survey allows us to generate the new 
distribution of the South African population over the labour market choices incorporated in the 
model. 
  
                                                 
10 A regression model is used to predict earnings for each individual for each category. More details are provided in 
the next section. 
11 The skill level is derived from the occupation for those observed working at the time of the survey and from the 
former occupation, when data is available, for the inactive and unemployed. An ordered probit model is estimated to 
predict the skill level when the relevant information is not available in the survey. 
12 The estimated parameters of the selection model are presented in Appendix A. 
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2.2.2.  The regression model for earnings 
 
  The regression model is used to predict individual gross earnings in each of the five 
labour market categories. This variable influences the labour market choices made in the 
selection model. Furthermore, predicted earnings are used at the end of the microsimulation 
process when household real net incomes are calculated. Equation (3) below expresses the (log) 
predicted gross earnings PGEi,j of individual i in labour market j as a linear function of individual 
characteristics Xij, the inverse Mills ratio imrij and unobserved earnings determinants vij: 
 
PGEij = αh(i),j + Xij.βh(i),j + δh(i),j.imrij + vij        ( 3 )  
 
The set of individual characteristics Xij essentially includes age, education, province of 
residence, race, skill level, language and ability to write. The inverse Mills ratios are estimated 
using a benchmark run of the selection model, where earnings are excluded from the explanatory 
variables. The inverse Mills ratios control for the selection bias of observing an individual’s 
earnings (Maddala, 1983). 
The regression model, like the selection model, is estimated separately for the four 
demographic groups h(i).
13 Since formal and informal sectors are the only labour market 
segments where individuals receive earnings, the results of the regression model are used to 
assign predicted formal and informal earnings to all individuals in the model. However, for those 
individuals who were formal or informal workers at the time of the survey, observed earnings are 
used rather than predicted earnings. 
 
2.2.3.  Calculation of household income  
 
After running the selection and the regression models described above, individual earnings 
are added to other (observed) income to generate the updated household incomes Yh. Equation (4) 
describes how the real net income of household h is computed: 
 
Yh = [Σiєh PGEi,FS.FWi + PGEi,IS.IWi + yh – taxesh]/CPIh      ( 4 )  
 
FWi is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i is found to be a formal worker and 
zero otherwise. Likewise, IWi indicates if individual i is predicted to be an informal worker. 
Therefore, the earnings in the formal sector PGEi,FS are summed only over household members 
actually engaged as formal workers. Correspondingly, informal earnings PGEi,IS are added to the 
household income only if individual i is found to be an informal worker. The model also accounts 
for non-labour incomes of the household, yh. The majority of non-labour income consists of 
incomes from capital, and transfer incomes from other South African households, from abroad 
and from the government. 
The sum of labour and non-labour incomes is gross household income from which we 
subtract the income tax payable (taxesh). However, only earnings from the formal sector are 
considered as being taxable. Income taxes are computed at the individual level by applying the 
                                                 
13 Chow tests confirm that the coefficients are significantly different in the four demographic groups. The estimated 
parameters of the regression model are presented in Appendix B. 
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official tax rates from the South African Revenue Service.
14 Then, household net income is 
deflated by a household-specific consumer price index CPIh. Two sources of data are used to 
compute the household CPI: the budget shares of household h are observed in the micro-data 
while the price changes are derived from the CGE model. As a result, the household real net 
income  Yh takes into account household-specific expenditure patterns.
15 This particular 
characteristic of the model is of interest when the focus is on poverty and inequality impacts of 
policy changes because expenditure patterns are significantly different for low-income and high-
income households. Moreover, the price changes derived from the CGE model vary substantially 
amongst the 43 goods included in the model.  
 
3.  CGE modelling  
 
The development of CGE models can be traced to Johansen (1960), Harberger (1962) and 
Scarf (1973). The main innovation introduced by these models is the explicit consideration of the 
general equilibrium effects. This built-in characteristic explains why CGE models have been so 
intensively used in the last decade, especially for the assessment of trade liberalisation policies in 
developing countries. As a matter of fact, openness to trade cannot be satisfactorily evaluated 
under a partial equilibrium framework. The liberalisation of trade in a given sector is more than 
likely to have some effects beyond this single sector. The most straightforward examples may 
occur if the output of this sector is used as an intermediate input in other sectors or if the sector of 




In most of the CGE models, producers maximise profits subject to their existing production 
technology and households maximise utility subject to a budget constraint, but the government 
does not have an objective function. The latter is one of the reasons why more constraints are 
necessary in order to “close” the model and define how the economic system operates. In 
practice, the aim is to have the same number of equations and endogenous variables in the model. 
The required additional constraints are often referred to as the closure rules or system constraints 
and are of particular interest because they determine, to a large extent, the way in which the 
model behaves. They ensure equilibrium is reached by answering such questions as: is the budget 
deficit fixed or flexible? Is the exchange rate or the current account fixed? These closure rules 
also enforce the ex post equality of investments and savings.
16
The first CGE models were mainly applied to developed countries and were directly 
derived from the neoclassical general equilibrium theory. These models could be classified as 
walrasian, assuming the full employment of production factors, and they primarily focused on 
the optimal allocation of resources. Nevertheless, it became rapidly obvious that the usual 
                                                 
14 Observed income taxes from micro- and macro-data are not used for various reasons. First and foremost because 
tax and income data do not refer to the same period. Moreover, there is no consistency between micro and macro tax 
data. Therefore, results, as well as base values, are computed using official tax rates rather than those derived from 
observed taxes. The results are reasonably robust to the use of observed tax rates instead of official tax rates. The 
differences are driven by the evident underestimation of tax rates and the absence of progressivity when using 
observed taxe rates. As a consequence, the use of observed taxes places a light downward pressure on poverty 
measures while inequality is always found to increase. 
15 However, the model does not allow for a change in consumption patterns due to relative price changes. 
16 About CGE closures, see Sen (1963) and Robinson (2003). 
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neoclassical hypotheses did not match with the complexity of the real economy. For more than 
fifteen years, these hypotheses have been progressively relaxed in order to allow for more and 
more market imperfections such as unemployment, price rigidities, and imperfect competition. 
However, regarding the estimation of poverty and inequality measures, the main drawback 
of CGE models remains the unavoidably limited number of representative household groups 
(RHG).
17 This means that exogeneity assumptions about the within-RHG income distribution 
have to be made that do not always fit the historical evidence. In addition, this implies that the 
within-RHG income distribution has to be held fixed unless another assumption can be made 
regarding the way it varies. Robilliard et al. (2001) noted that the limited number of RHG is 
leading to “a systematic underestimation of the impact on inequality, (…) [and] an 
underestimation of the impact on poverty”. 
 
3.2.  Key characteristics  
 
The CGE model used in this paper was developed by Hérault (2004) based on the 2000 
South African social accounting matrix (SAM). It is a static model similar in many aspects to the 
model presented in Thurlow and van Seventer (2002)
18 which can be classified as a neoclassical-
structuralist model in the tradition originally introduced in Dervis et al. (1982). The aim of this 
section is not to provide the reader with a complete description of the model but rather with a 
basic background on the macro data and the functioning of the model. Table 3 presents the 
structure of the South African gross domestic production. 
 
Table 3:   Structure of Gross Domestic Production (2000)
(a)
   Value (Billions of Current Rand)  Share of GDP (Market Prices) 
Private consumption  556.7  59.8 
Fixed investment  131.8  14.1 
Inventory changes  8.7  0.9 
Government consumption  209.9  22.5 
Exports 249.1  26.7 
Imports -224.6  -24.1 
GDP (market prices)  931.6  100 
Net indirect taxes  100  10.7 
GDP (factor cost)  831.6  89.3 
Note: The average exchange rate in 2000 was $US 1 = R6.94. Source: 2000 South African SAM 
 
The low share of investment (14.1% of GDP) remains a structural characteristic of the 
South African economy and it is remarkably stable since it was already 14.1% of the GDP in 
1993. South Africa is classified by the World Bank (2001) as an upper middle-income country 
with a GDP per capita of $2,620. The country can be thought of as an economic leader in the 
region, Sub-Saharan Africa, which is primarily composed of low-income and least developed 
countries. Indeed, the South African GDP accounts for more than one third of the Sub-Saharan 
Africa global GDP and its GDP per capita is more than five times higher than the regional figure. 
International trade (i.e. exports plus imports) makes up almost half of the GDP, where the 
                                                 
17 For more details on the limitations of CGE models see Round and Whalley (2002), Iqbal and Siddiqui (2001), 
Hérault (2003),  Dervis et al. (1982), Thurlow and van Seventer (2002) and Thurlow (2003). 
18 The author is very grateful to James Thurlow and the International Food Policy Research Institute for their 
technical support during (and after) the advanced CGE workshop at the University of Cape Town in January 2004. 
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European Union is, by far, the most important trading partner. The share of international trade in 
GDP is still below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa but it has been increasing rapidly since the 
early 1990’s, partly due to the implementation of economic policies directed towards more 
openness. Unlike the neighbouring countries, manufactured products represent the bulk of South 
African exports. 
 
The South African CGE model is based on the 2000 SAM, which includes 43 sectors and 4 
factors of production: high-skilled labour, skilled labour, low-skilled labour and one type of 
capital. The South African trade has been regionally disaggregated as in Thurlow (2003).
19 
Following the Armington specification (Armington, 1969), imported and domestic products are 
imperfect substitutes which allow for intra-branch trade. There is no data available at the macro 
level regarding the informal sector, which is therefore not represented in the SAM. The results 
from the CGE model are available under three different sets of closures: two Keynesian closures 
and one neoclassical closure.
20 Each of these closures is based on a number of different 
assumptions regarding some key components of the economy, as discussed in Table 4.  
These constraints determine to a large extent the functioning of the modelled economy. 
Table 4 describes briefly how each of the closures affects the factor market, the savings-
investment account, the current account and the government account.
21 In each closure, 
unemployment amongst low-skilled and skilled workers is allowed by assuming either nominal 
or real earnings to be fixed. All closures have a short term focus since capital is not mobile across 
sectors. Most important when dealing with CGE models is how savings and investment adjust in 
each closure. 
In the Neoclassical closure, investment is savings-driven. That is, the investment level is 
the endogenous variable that adjusts ex post to the level of savings. In this specification, an 
increase in the government deficit (equivalent to a decrease in government savings) depresses 
investment because of the implicit higher interest rate. Hence, a crowding-out of investment 
follows any growing government deficit. The long-term empirical study by Nell (2003) supports 
this point of view in the case of South Africa. 
The adjustment mechanism is less obvious in the Keynesian closures because both 
investment and savings are assumed to be fixed and both producer and consumer prices are 
flexible. In the first Keynesian closure, nominal earnings of skilled and low-skilled workers are 
fixed. If, after an exogenous shock, savings happen to be insufficient then a price increase is 
required to lower real wages. Consequently, this generates a boost in production and employment 
until savings reach the desired level of investment. The implicit assumption is that unions are too 
weak (for instance because of the high level of unemployment) to obtain any improvement in 
earnings when prices go up. The main concern with this closure is that it does not allow for any 
expansion of employment without a fall in real earnings, and that may not be consistent with the 
economic reality (see Robinson, 2003). Moreover, the empirical study over the period 1997-2001  
 
                                                 
19 There are 10 trading partners in the model, namely: Southern African Development Community (SADC), Rest of 
Africa (ROA), United States of America (US), Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), European Union (EU), 
India, China, Japan, Rest of East Asia (ROEA), and Rest of World (ROW). 
20 These designations are only indicative. In the CGE literature, the differences between closures are usually more 
pronounced. Here, the main distinction concerns the savings-investment account whereas the closures of the other 
accounts are more in concordance with empirical observations rather than economic theories. 
21 More information on the closures of the South African CGE can be found in Hérault (2004), Thurlow and van 
Seventer (2002) and Thurlow (2003). 
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Table 4:   Closure rules  
   Keynes 1  Keynes 2  Neoclassical 
Factor market: 
 




fixed real earnings; 
mobile factors; 
flexible supply 
High-skilled labour  flexible earnings; mobile factor; flexible supply 
Capital  flexible activity-specific returns; immobile factor; fixed supply 
Savings-Investment  fixed investment; 
fixed savings rates 
flexible investment; 
fixed savings rates 
Current account  flexible exchange rate; 
fixed foreign savings 
fixed exchange rate; 
flexible foreign savings 
flexible exchange rate; 
fixed foreign savings 
Government account  flexible government savings; fixed direct tax rates; 
fixed real government consumption 
Numeraire price 
flexible consumer price 




flexible consumer price 
index; flexible producer 
price index; 
fixed exchange rate 
(=numeraire) 
flexible consumer price 
index; 
fixed producer price 
index (=numeraire) 
 
by Muller et al. (2004) supports the view that real earnings are fixed in the South African formal 
sector. 
The second Keynesian closure alleviates the latter concern by considering real rather than 
nominal earnings to be fixed. However, this is achieved at the expense of the current account 
closure where the nominal exchange rate now has to be fixed because of the need for a 
numeraire. As a result, foreign savings adjust to ensure the balance of the current account. In this 
specification, a shortfall in savings is basically offset by an increase in foreign savings. Indeed, 
the rise in earnings following any increase in prices implies a real appreciation and thus, a 
deterioration of the trade balance which can only be counterbalanced by an increase in foreign 
savings. 
 
4.  Linking CGE and Microsimulation modelling  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, CGE and microsimulation (MS) models have 
relatively long histories, which go back to the early 1960’s. The idea of linking these two 
approaches was envisaged for the first time by Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982). Although, 
this idea was realised only by the end of the 1990’s (see Decaluwé et al. 1999, Cogneau 1999), 
the literature on this subject has been flourishing since then. The aim of combining these models 
is to exploit the advantages of CGE and MS modelling. This approach offsets the respective 
drawbacks of each type of model, which are primarily the lack of general equilibrium effects in 
MS models and the limitations arising from the representative household assumptions in CGE 
models. 
By providing a comprehensive picture of the economy, micro-macro models (the 
combination of a CGE and a MS model) allow an analysis at the microeconomic level of 
macroeconomic policy simulations. There are several ways of linking these two types of model.
22
                                                 
22 See Savard (2003, 2004), and Cororaton and Cockburn (2005) for a more extensive survey of the literature. 
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A first approach consists of increasing the number of representative households in the CGE 
model. These so-called integrated CGE-MS models can incorporate as many households as found 
in household surveys (see Cockburn 2002, Cororaton and Cockburn 2005, Cogneau and 
Robilliard 2000). The heterogeneity in household behaviours, as well as in expenditure and 
income patterns, is thus captured by the model in a general equilibrium framework. Although this 
seems to be the ideal approach, the data requirements can prove to be large and full reconciliation 
between micro and macro data is essential. Moreover, the size of the model can quickly become 
problematic and force the modeller to impose some simplifications either on the complexity of 
microeconomic household behaviours or on the size of the CGE model in terms of the number of 
sectors and factors of production. 
The “top-down” approach used in this paper is an alternative to integrated models. It relies 
on using a CGE and a MS model in a sequential way: first the CGE model is run, followed by a 
second step in which the changes in some selected variables are passed on to the MS model (see 
Robilliard et al., 2001).
23 As is the case with integrated models, “top-down” models have the 
advantage of avoiding the use of representative agent assumptions, while accounting for general 
equilibrium effects. Since both models are run separately, nothing prevents the use of fairly 
comprehensive models. This method also has the advantage of not formally requiring full 
reconciliation of micro and macro data. However, it also implies a lack of theoretical consistency 
because nothing guarantees coherence between the CGE and the MS models  
Savard (2003) presents a method capable of overcoming this latter problem by using a so-
called “top-down bottom-up” (TDBU) approach. In a CGE-TDBU model aggregate results from 
the MS model are incorporated in the CGE model. A loop is used to run both models iteratively 
until convergence is obtained. However, the existence of a converging solution is not guaranteed. 
 
4.1  Application of the “top-down” approach 
 
This paper presents an application of the “top-down” approach to the South African case. 
The focus is on poverty and inequality impacts of trade liberalisation policies. 
The first step consists of running the CGE model to simulate the complete removal of 
import tariffs. The model returns the new macro-structure of the economy after the “shock”, 
while taking into account the interactions between the various sectors of the economy. In the 
context of the “top-down” approach, three sets of variables are of particular interest: prices, 
returns from capital and labour, and employment levels. In a second step, the changes in these 
variables are passed on to the MS model. With regard to the prices, this procedure is relatively 
straightforward, because prices are exogenous to the MS model. The original expenditure items 
from the IES have been mapped to the corresponding commodity groups according to the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
24 The 96 commodity groups obtained from this 
mapping have been further aggregated to match the 43 goods of the CGE model. The 43 price 
changes computed by the CGE model are simply passed on to the MS model.
25
The procedure is more complex for the two other sets of variables. The changes from the 
CGE model cannot be directly transmitted to the MS model since the MS model is based on 
microeconomic data whereas the CGE model only returns macro numbers. The two sets of 
                                                 
23 Our model borrows heavily from Robilliard et al. (2001), especially with regard to the methodology being 
employed. 
24 See PROVIDE project (2005) for more details. 
25 The new prices are used to compute a household-specific consumer price index (see section 2.2.3). 
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numbers are not automatically consistent with each other. In the “top-down” approach, the macro 
outcomes are imposed on the micro model. That is, coefficients of the MS model have to be 
modified in such a way that it reproduces the macro numbers obtained from the CGE model, 
while allowing for the price and factor return changes which may affect individuals’ behaviours. 
This is achieved by applying micro-macro consistency equations, as explained in the next 
subsection. 
 
4.2  Micro-macro consistency equations 
 
The CGE model provides us with the total earnings from wages and salaries, and total 
returns from capital after the policy change. Given that three types of labour are incorporated in 
the CGE model, it means that it returns three earnings; that is the earnings for high-skilled, semi-
skilled and low-skilled workers. These earnings concern only the formal workers since the 
informal sector is not represented in the CGE model. In contrast, capital returns potentially 
concern all households. 
The earnings changes are transmitted to the MS model by applying the resulting earnings 
changes per employee from the CGE model to the predicted earnings of each individual in the 
formal sector. Equation 5 expresses this relation: 
 
PGEi,j,k = PGEi,j,k.(1 + ∆Wk)   k=LS,SK,HS, j=formal  sector    (5) 
 
Depending on the skill level k of the considered individual i, the corresponding percentage 
change in earnings ∆Wk, derived from the CGE model, is added to the predicted gross earnings of 
individual i as a formal worker PGEi,j,k.
26 Given that the structure of the labour force by skill 
level is very similar in both macro- and micro-data, the MS model is thus able to reproduce the 
changes in the aggregated figures from the CGE model concerning the formal earnings. 
Regarding the informal earnings, the assumption is that their change depends on the 
changes in formal employment levels and total formal earnings as represented by equation 6: 
 
PGEi,j,k = PGEi,j,k.(1+∆FE + ½*∆Ek)   k=LS,SK,HS,  j=informal sector    (6) 
 
where ∆FE is the percentage change in total formal earnings and ∆Ek is the percentage change in 
formal employment by skill level. The underlying assumption is that working in the informal 
sector is a survival strategy and that formal workers are the main consumers of informal goods. 
Consequently, when the formal sector is expanding one would expect fewer people to rely on the 
informal sector while at the same time there should be more demand for informal goods. As a 
result, individual informal earnings are expected to depend positively on total formal earnings 
and formal employment.
27 This might prove to be unrealistic but other better-informed choices 
are limited due to the lack of empirical studies.
28
                                                 
26 More precisely, the predicted gross earnings are a mix of observed and predicted earnings (see section 2.2 for 
further details). 
27 The unity coefficient in front of ∆FE is based on the assumption that the elasticity of individual informal earnings 
with respect to formal earnings is equal to one. The elasticity of individual informal earnings with respect to formal 
employment is assumed to be 0.5, which is derived from preliminary results of the MS model which have shown that 
the formal employment elasticity of informal employment is approximately 0.5. 
28 Another alternative was explored in which individual informal earnings vary in the same way as individual formal 
earnings by skill level. Although the direction of the results remained largely unaffected, all impacts were lower 
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The change in capital returns is transmitted to the MS model at the household level since 
income from capital is a household level variable in the micro-data. The resulting percentage 
change in capital returns predicted in the CGE is applied to the total income from capital of each 
household, as reported in equation 7: 
 
Kh = Kh.(1+∆K)           ( 7 )  
 
The capital income Kh of each household h is increased (or decreased) by ∆K, where ∆K is the 
percentage change in capital returns from the CGE model.  
In addition to capital income, other components of household non-labour income are also 
affected by the changes from the CGE model. Transfer incomes from other South African 
households are updated using changes in formal and informal earnings in accordance with the 
sectoral distribution of each racial group.
29 Transfer incomes from abroad are assumed to be fixed 
in the foreign currency and are consequently adjusted following changes in the exchange rate. 
Since real government expenditures are fixed in the CGE model, transfer incomes from the 
government are indexed to the CPI.  
Although this was not explicitly mentioned in section 2.2, household income from capital 
and transfers is included in the selection model.
30 As a result, any change in capital income or in 
the transfer incomes of a given household can potentially affect the labour market choices of its 
members. 
 
Even though the changes in the predicted earnings and the capital returns already imply that 
some people will switch from a sector to another, this is not sufficient to ensure full consistency 
between the two models as far as employment levels are concerned. Changes in the number of 
formal workers by skill level in the MS model must match those same changes in the CGE 
model. This can be done by modifying some specific coefficients of the selection model. The 
most straightforward choice is to target the coefficients associated with the skill level in the 
equation defining the utility level in the formal sector. As defined in equations (1) and (2) (see 
section 2.2), these coefficients are B1 for skilled individuals, B2 for high-skilled individuals and 
the constant a for low-skilled individuals, since the latter group is the reference category. 
Moreover, given that the selection model is estimated separately for four demographic groups, it 
means that to solve the consistency problem, a new set of 12 parameters (ah(i),FS, B1h(i),FS, B2h(i),FS) 
is required such that the numbers of formal low-skilled, skilled and high-skilled workers equal 
the corresponding numbers obtained from the CGE. This constraint is described by: 
 
Σi Σq Ind[Ui,FS(ah(i),FS, B1h(i),FS, B2h(i),FS)+ui,FS,q = Maxj ( Ui,j(ah(i),j, B1h(i),j, B2h(i),j) )+uijq and 
skilli=k] /Q= FSWk.(1+∆Ek) with  k=LS,SK,HS       (8) 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
because of the implied cut in the growth of informal earnings. This was particularly true under the first Keynesian 
closure because of decreasing real earnings for low-skilled and skilled formal workers. 
29 The underlying assumption is that the majority of these transfers is generated by workers in the formal or informal 
sector, who live outside the household. 
30 Transfer incomes from South African households and from abroad are included in the predicted earnings while 
capital income and government transfers are considered as separate independent variables. 
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where Ui,FS defines the utility of individual i as a formal worker. ui,FS,q and uijq are the q
th draws 
from the error distribution for individual i and category FS or category j and Q is the total number 
of draws selected (see section 2.2.1). FSWk is the benchmark number of formal workers, with 
skill level (skilli) equal to k, in the MS model and ∆Ek is the percentage variation in the number of 
formal workers predicted by the CGE model. 
To summarise, the consistency problem now consists of solving a system of three equations 
and 12 variables. Consequently, further assumptions are necessary. The choice made in this paper 
is to impose the same percentage changes on the parameters for the four demographic groups:
31
 
ah(i),FS = a’h(I),FS.(1+∆a),      h(i)=sw, mw, sm, mm     ( 9 )  
B1h(i),FS = B1’h(i),FS.(1+∆B1),       h(i)=sw, mw, sm, mm        (10) 
B2h(i),FS = B2’h(I,),FS.(1+∆B2),       h(i)=sw, mw, sm, mm        (11) 
 
where (a’h(i),FS, B1’h(i),FS, B2’h(i),FS) are the parameter values as estimated using the micro data, and 
∆a, ∆B1 and ∆B2 are the percentage changes imposed respectively on these parameter values in all 
demographic groups. This particular choice implies that the MS model is allowed to determine 
which individuals, amongst the entire population, will fill the need for more formal workers if 
their number is to increase in the CGE model. On the contrary, if the number of formal workers is 
found to decrease, then the MS model will freely choose the individuals with the highest 
probability to lose their job, amongst all formal workers.
32 Another option would have been, for 
instance, to keep constant the proportions of formal workers by demographic group. Our choice 
restricts the utility of being in the formal sector due to an individual’s specific skill level to 
increase with the same percentage across the four demographic groups.
33  
  Now, there are three endogenous variables (∆a, ∆B1, ∆B2) to solve the three consistency 
equations presented in (8). This is done through an iterative process. The first step is to find the 
appropriate change (∆a) in the constant to obtain the appropriate number of low-skilled formal 
workers. Effectively, since the latter group is the reference category, this number is not affected 
by changes in B1 and B2.
34 The second step consists of finding the appropriate change (∆B1) in B1 
that results in the required number of skilled formal workers. In the last step, the endogenous 
variable (∆B2) is adjusted to obtain the desired number of high-skilled formal workers. 
  Regarding the informal workers, no constraint is imposed on the macro outcomes of the 
MS model since this segment of the labour market is not included in the CGE model. Indeed, 
only the macro outcomes concerning the formal sector, which accounts for 70% of paid workers 
(see table 1), are imposed on the MS model. As a result, the number of people in the four other 
sectors (inactive, unemployed, subsistence agriculture and informal sector) is entirely determined 
by the MS model as a function of individual characteristics and as a function of the required 
changes in formal employment. 
                                                 
31 sw, mw, sm and mm stand for single women, married women, single men and married men respectively. 
32 In fact, the process is slightly more complex. The MS model allows some people to find a formal job and others to 
lose their formal job independent of whether the CGE model predicts an increase or a decrease in the aggregate 
number. The consistency constraints concern only the aggregate results of the MS model since the CGE model only 
returns numbers at the macro level.  
33 Given that already more than two thirds of the married men were formal workers at the time of the household 
survey, it seems sensible to allow for a variation in their share of all formal workers, especially if the total number of 
formal workers is found to increase after a policy change. 
34 However, it is essential to solve first for ∆a since the changes in the constant also have an impact on the utility 
functions of skilled and high-skilled workers. 
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  To conclude, the micro-macro consistency equations, along with the direct transmission 
of prices, ensure that changes in prices, in earnings from wages and salaries, in returns from 
capital, and in employment levels are fully transmitted from the CGE to the MS model. Given 
any change in the macroeconomic structure of the economy defined by the CGE model, the MS 
model predicts how individual agents modify their behaviours and how their incomes are 
affected, while accounting for individual heterogeneity. Therefore, it provides us with an updated 
picture of the economy at the microeconomic level taking into account the simulated changes in 
macroeconomic policies. The following section uses the CGE-MS model described above to 
assess the effects of trade liberalisation in South Africa. 
 
5.  A first simulation: the removal of all tariffs 
 
Since the early 1990’s, South Africa has been involved in a trade liberalisation process. As 
a result, the decline in tariffs was uninterrupted throughout the 1990’s and the weighted average 
tariff decreased by one third between 1993 and 2000. Moreover, the highly complex tariff regime 
was simplified. In particular, South Africa committed itself to eliminate, or convert into bound ad 
valorem rates, all quantitative restrictions by 1998. The process even went beyond the Uruguay 
Round commitments announced in 1994 (see Jonsson et al., 2001).
35
South African trade policy relies on unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation 
in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The free trade area agreement with the 
European Union, by far the most important trading partner of South Africa, was signed in 1999 
and due to be progressively implemented from 2000 onwards. Unilateral trade liberalisation is 
also on top of the South African political agenda, mainly because of its commitments under the 
WTO and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme. This section uses the CGE-
MS model described above to assess the short-run effects of the full elimination of tariffs. The 
first section presents the macroeconomic effects while the second section focuses on poverty and 
inequality impacts. 
 
5.1  Macro-results from the CGE model 
 
  The ratio of import duties collected to the value of imports is only 3.6% but there are 
some important disparities between the commodities.
36 For instance, petroleum products enter 
virtually duty free while the tariff on rubber is 24.2%. The total amount of collected duties 
represents 8.2 billion rand, which is equivalent to 3.6% of government income. Consequently, the 
removal of tariffs only implies a limited loss of revenue for the government. However, it also 
affects the economy through the declining prices of imported commodities. Table 5 below 
summarises the results of the CGE model under three different closures. 
The initial impact is due to the lowering of import prices, which causes a shift towards 
imported goods and away from domestic production. As the value of imports rises and trade 
balance deteriorates, the exchange rate depreciates which promotes exports and contributes to 
maintain the current account balance. Regarding the government account, the loss of import 
duties implies an increase in the government deficit between 0.58 and 0.73 percentage point of  
 
                                                 
35 South Africa is a member of the WTO. 
36 All estimates presented refer to the year 2000. The CGE model uses the value of the collected duties rather than 
the official tariff rates in order to account for the numerous rebates (see Thurlow and van Seventer, 2002). 
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Table 5: Simulation results from the elimination of import tariffs 
   BASE  Keynes 1  Keynes 2  Neoclassical 
   Values
(a) Percentage change from base year
(b)
Real  GDP  R888 0.59 0.37 0.30 
CPI -  1.15  -0.57  -0.24 
Real exchange rate  -  0.74  0.22  0.57 
Nominal exchange rate  -  2.16  -  0.59 
Exports  (volume)  R249 1.81 0.95 1.41 
Imports  (volume)  R225 2.01 1.98 1.56 
Trade balance  5% -0.72 -0.48 -0.73 
Private savings  R154 3.54 1.15 1.35 
Government deficit  -2% -0.58 -0.69 -0.73 
Foreign savings  R4 2.16  57.05 0.59 
Investment  15% -0.21 -0.19 -0.45 
Total real household consumption  R556 0.94 0.97 0.86 
Factor real returns             
Capital  - 2.59 1.89 1.76 
Low-skilled labour  - -1.32  -  - 
Skilled labour  - -1.13  -  - 
High-skilled labour  - 0.55 0.57 0.48 
Factor demand             
Low-skilled labour                    3,596  1.42  0.65  0.50 
Skilled labour                    2,718  1.34  0.74  0.64 
High-skilled labour                    1,118  0.27  0.29  0.24 
Note: (a) Values in billions of rand, percentage of GDP and thousands of workers (b) Changes for base values expressed as a 
percentage of GDP are expressed in percentage points of GDP. Source: author's calculations 
 
GDP. Finally, the mechanisms invoked to bring back the balance between savings and 
investment depend on the closure. 
  In the first Keynesian closure, money illusion amongst low-skilled and skilled workers
37 
implies that the increase in the consumer price index causes their real earnings to decrease. The 
lower cost of these two production factors, along with the diminished price of imported 
intermediate goods and the stimulation of exports through the real exchange rate depreciation, is 
at the root of real GDP growth. This GDP growth, together with the induced job creation, 
supports the rise in aggregate income. In turn, this allows for an increase in private savings which 
finances the widening government deficit. A growing economy also means more demand for 
capital and high-skilled labour. Given the limited supply of these factors, their real returns are 
found to increase significantly. There is a boost in total real household consumption as the 
decline in real earnings for low-skilled and skilled workers is more than offset by the expansion 
in employment and by the increased real returns of capital and high-skilled labour. 
Under the second Keynesian closure, there is no money illusion amongst low-skilled and 
skilled workers and the nominal exchange rate is fixed. Consequently, the deteriorating trade 
balance is funded by an increase in foreign savings. The expansion in exports is halved because 
the real depreciation is much less important than in the previous closure. The drop in the 
consumer price index, resulting from falling import prices, causes nominal earnings of skilled 
and low-skilled workers to go down. Therefore, their relative competitiveness improves, which 
                                                 
37 Since nominal earnings are fixed for these workers. 
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results in a downward pressure on unemployment. The induced economic growth, which is also 
boosted by the decline in imported intermediate inputs, calls for more use of the two scarce 
production factors. As a result, real returns of capital and high-skilled labour rise substantially. 
Given that in this closure there is no contraction in real earnings of low-skilled and skilled 
workers, and since inflation has now turned into deflation, the increase in total real household 
consumption is found to be slightly higher than in the previous closure, despite a lower real GDP 
growth. 
  The Neoclassical closure implies both fixed real earnings and a flexible exchange rate but 
the level of investment is now free to adjust to the changes in savings. As in the previous 
closures, two phenomena are at the origin of real GDP growth: the boost in exports generated by 
the exchange rate depreciation and the lower prices of imported inputs. However, the expansion 
of the government deficit is not balanced with an increase in foreign or private savings. Instead, 
there is a crowding-out of investment, which explains why the recorded real GDP growth is less 
than what is observed under the Keynesian closures. Once more, trade liberalisation implies a 
decrease in the consumer price index, which translates into more demand for low-skilled and 
skilled workers since their real earnings are fixed. The increase in total real household 
consumption stems from a combination of the lower level of unemployment and the growth in 
real returns of capital and high-skilled labour.  
 
To summarise, the strongest effects are found when there is money illusion, like in the first 
Keynesian closure, while the smallest effects occur when allowing for a crowding-out effect of 
investment, like in the Neoclassical closure. More generally, the effects are greater under the 
Keynesian closures because savings and investment adjust through the new incomes generated by 
the fall in unemployment and because there is no crowding-out effect. 
More disaggregated data (not shown in Table 5), regarding the level of activity in the 43 
sectors of the model, show that there are both losers and winners from trade liberalisation. The 
sectors benefiting most from trade liberalisation are those orientated towards exports or 
household final consumption and with a low initial level of protection like transport, 
communication, trade and catering services. The sectors with the highest initial levels of 
protection are the systematic losers. They include the following sectors: footwear, rubber, glass, 
non-metal minerals, metal products and electrical machinery. Depending on the closure, this list 
can be extended to leather and textile industries. Finally, trade liberalisation seems to be more 
favourable to services than to manufacturing sectors. This explains why the boost in demand for 
skilled labour is found to be systematically higher than the surge in demand for low-skilled 
labour, because manufacturing is more intensive in low-skilled labour than the rest of the 
economy. 
Regarding household incomes, all results converge towards a gain. Nevertheless, given the 
contrast between the changes in real returns from capital and high-skilled labour on the one hand, 
and real earnings from low-skilled and skilled labour on the other hand, a worsening of the inter-
group income distribution can be expected.
38 Moreover, regarding low-income households, the 
MS model will have to determine whether the decrease in real (or nominal) earnings for formal 
low-skilled and skilled workers is offset by the upward trend in formal employment levels. 
 
                                                 
38 High-skilled labour and capital are the most important sources of income for rich (mainly white) households 
whereas (black and coloured) poor households’ incomes depend essentially on the earnings of low-skilled and skilled 
workers. 
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5.2  Micro-results from the microsimulation model 
 
Table 6 presents the effects of trade liberalisation at the household level for the entire South 
African population, as well as for each racial group.
39 The effects prove to be substantially 
different depending on the racial group, especially regarding the changes in labour market status. 
As will be explained later in further detail, the impacts amongst racial groups are mainly driven 
by the differences in the subpopulation distribution by skill level and labour market sector. Given 
that the expansion in formal sector employment is stronger for low-skilled and skilled workers 
(see table 5), blacks (and, to a lesser extent, coloureds) are found to benefit the most from formal 
job creations. Indeed, there is a substantial stock of unemployed and inactive low-skilled black 
workers while Asians and whites have higher skill levels and higher levels of employment. 
Accordingly, in both closures, more than half of the new formal workers are blacks who were 
formerly unemployed or inactive. The trend is thus toward a rather significant decrease in poverty 
incidence.
40 The increase in formal employment is the main force driving poverty alleviation, 
largely offsetting the negative impact of decreasing formal real earnings under the first Keynesian 
closure. The larger growth in formal employment under this closure explains the larger poverty 
reduction despite a lower increase in real income per capita. The dampening effect is even 
stronger on the poverty gap index and the poverty severity index than on the poverty incidence. 
This is due to the fact that the poor households moving out of poverty, because one (or more) 
members find a formal job, were more deeply in poverty than the very few new households 
moving into poverty because of lower formal earnings. It is observed that poor households with 
one (or more) members in formal employment tend not to be the poorest households. Another 
interesting result is that, despite a minor increase in real income, coloureds experience a more 
important decrease in poverty than blacks. This can be attributed to the much higher share of 
formal workers amongst coloureds than amongst blacks: despite a smaller percentage increase in 
the number of formal workers (starting from a larger base value), the percentage decreases in the 
other labour market categories are stronger for coloureds than for blacks. This explanation also 
holds for Asians and whites when compared to blacks.  
Another result that becomes evident from the table is that the number of informal workers 
amongst whites and Asians exhibits an upward trend, especially for whites. Whites and Asians 
are less in demand than blacks (and coloureds) to fill the new formal jobs. This is due to their 
higher skill levels and the fact that they are already more likely to work in formal employment. 
Thus, the number of individuals entering the informal sector because of higher earnings is greater 
than the number of informal workers moving in the direction of the formal sector. Moreover, 
following the tightening gap between formal and informal earnings, there is a significant flow of 
white high-skilled workers moving from the formal to the informal sector, where earnings are not 
taxed. This phenomenon is the main contributor to the vigorous growth of informal white 
earnings. It also strengthens the rise in average informal earnings. However, at the country level, 
the latter increase is mainly caused by the trickle down effect of the formal sector development  
 
                                                 
39 In order to present a table of a reasonable size, results from the second Keynesian closure have been omitted 
because they are similar in many respects to the results obtained with the Neoclassical closure. However, the 
decreases in poverty indicators are slightly more important under the Keynesian closure because the presence of the 
Keynesian multiplier effect implies more job creations. 
40 When interpreting poverty changes at the national level, it should be borne in mind that blacks account for more 
than 95% of all poor. 
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Table 6:  Simulation Results from the MS model (percentage change from the base values as presented in 
tables 1 and 2)  
   Keynes 1  Neoclassical 
   All    Blacks Coloureds Asians Whites  All Blacks Coloureds Asians Whites 
Inactive
(a) -0.16 -0.12  -0.28  -0.46  -0.36  -0.07 -0.04  -0.11 -0.19 -0.20 
Unemployed  -0.91 -0.86  -1.39  -1.13  -1.35  -0.36 -0.33  -0.55 -0.62 -0.67 
Subsistence  agriculture  -0.23 -0.23  -0.18  -0.58  -0.26  -0.10 -0.10  -0.06 -0.58 -0.11 
Informal  workers  -0.25 -0.34  -0.70 0.30 2.64  -0.14 -0.14  -0.29 -0.02  0.36 
Formal  workers  1.21 1.54  1.23  1.02  0.36  0.51 0.61  0.49 0.46 0.28 
Informal earnings
(b) 3.94 2.36  2.61  2.24  7.34  0.97 0.69  0.74 0.58 1.64 
Formal earnings
(b) -1.43 -1.71  -1.48  -0.97  -0.65  -0.13 -0.19  -0.11  0.01  0.08 
Real income per capita
(c) 0.69 0.61  0.21  0.43  0.91  0.65 0.63  0.49 0.57 0.72 
P0
(d) -1.55 -1.54  -1.75 0.00 0.00  -0.95 -0.96  -0.71  0.00  0.00 
P1
(d) -3.18 -3.05  -7.42  -12.26  -13.20  -1.57 -1.51  -3.49 -4.60 -4.59 
P2
(d) -4.25 -4.08  -9.58  -28.08  -21.59  -2.03 -1.96  -4.64  -10.66 -9.73 
Gini  -0.14 -0.42  -0.41  -0.19 0.36  -0.04 -0.11  -0.11 -0.08  0.12 
Note: (a) Including 652,000 "unspecified" workers (b) Average real per capita earnings (c) Average real disposable income 
per capita in Rand (d) The poverty line is the international $2/day poverty line (R174/month/capita in 2000 prices). 
 
on informal earnings. Indeed, the growth in formal employment and total formal earnings is 
indirectly responsible for the increase in informal per capita earnings.
41
Under the Neoclassical closure, the labour market changes are relatively similar albeit 
smaller than with the first Keynesian closure. This is not surprising given the smaller changes 
observed at the macro level (see table 5). Here, the decrease in formal per capita earnings is less 
important because real formal earnings are fixed at the macro level for low-skilled and skilled 
workers (whereas they were flexible and decreasing under the first Keynesian closure). The only 
downward pressure on formal per capita earnings now arises from the fact that the new formal 
workers tend to have a lower skill level, and thus lower earnings, than the former formal workers. 
At the macro level, the expansion of the formal sector is smaller in terms of employment and 
total earnings, which is why informal per capita earnings progress to a lesser extent. However, 
combined with deflation and formal job creations, this is enough to generate a reduction in 
poverty incidence. That is the decrease in nominal formal earnings of low-skilled and skilled 
workers is not sufficient to offset the positive impacts of the formal employment growth and the 
falling consumer price index. 
Regarding inequality, the results using either closure converge towards a small decline at 
the country level despite a visible worsening of the inter-group income distribution. The growth 
in real income per capita is systematically higher for whites (the richest racial group) than for the 
poorest groups (blacks and coloureds). However, the apparent increase in inter-group inequality 
is more than offset by the reductions in intra-group inequalities for blacks, coloureds and Asians 
due to the labour market changes.  
The upward trend in inter-group inequality is mostly caused by the surge in real capital 
returns and to a lesser extent by the differential rates of growth in formal earnings by skill level. 
The distribution of capital income is extremely unequal, with a Gini coefficient of more than 
0.95. Moreover, it is highly concentrated amongst whites, which explains the increase in 
inequality amongst this racial group. For whites, price effects are more important than labour 
market changes: the increase in inequality is driven by the fact that high-income households gain 
                                                 
41 A secondary reason is that most of the workers leaving the informal sector are low-skilled or skilled workers (who 
are moving to the formal sector), which pushes up the average skill level and thus average earnings. 
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from trade liberalisation because of the increase in real capital returns and real earnings from 
high-skilled labour. In contrast, labour market changes are more important than price changes for 
blacks and coloureds (and to a lesser extent for Asians) since capital income and high-skilled 
workers’ earnings account for a much smaller share of their incomes. The decrease in intra-group 
and total inequality is due to the fact that the poorest households are the main winners from the 
expansion in formal job creation because the latter is biased towards inactive and unemployed 




  In this paper, a CGE model and a MS model are combined in a sequential approach in 
order to assess the effects of trade liberalisation on South African households. Since there is no 
strong consensus emerging from the CGE literature regarding the most relevant closure to adopt 
when assessing trade liberalisation, three different closures with a short-run focus are used in this 
paper. The aim was to choose some closures either based upon economic theory, CGE literature 
or backed up by empirical evidence. One Neoclassical and two Keynesian macroeconomic 
closures of the CGE model are considered. Although the magnitude of the results can vary 
depending on the closure, a clear pattern emerges regarding the direction of the effects. Trade 
liberalisation appears to be pro-poor and to have a limited dampening effect on inequality. No 
matter the closure, the positive impact of formal job creations is always the main force leading to 
a decrease in poverty. Regarding inequality, the Gini coefficient shows a decreasing trend, 
independent of the closure used in the CGE model. There is an apparent increase in inter-group 
inequality, which is due to the fact that the two production factors showing the highest growth in 
their returns are skilled labour and capital. These two factors are the two main income sources of 
high-income (mainly white) households. However, the decrease in intra-group inequalities driven 
by the labour market changes is not completely offset by the more unequal income distribution 
due to increasing inter-group inequality. The results show that labour market changes are the 
most important factor placing a downward pressure on inequality and poverty while the increase 
in capital earnings tends to increase income inequality. 
Finally, the sensitivity analyses carried out in this paper reveal that the results are fairly 
robust to changes in both the CGE closures and the MS model’s assumptions made upon the links 
between the formal and the informal sector. However, additional sensitivity analyses may still 
prove useful. At a later stage, the plan is to extend the MS model to allow for discrete hours 
choices so changes in labour market choices can be modelled more precisely, but this is outside 
the scope of the current paper. 
In conclusion, the combination of a micro- and a macro-model allows the assessment of 
macro-policies beyond their economy-wide effects. Even though some micro-impacts can be 
inferred from the macro-results, the use of a micro-model has proved to be useful in order to 
evaluate more precisely these impacts as well as to carry out some disaggregated analyses. In this 
paper, the microeconomic effects of trade liberalisation are found to be quite diverse depending 
on the racial groups. Although whites emerge as the main winners, the poor are not left behind 
because they benefit from the creation of new formal jobs. Some preliminary results from a more 
disaggregated analysis, allowing for the distinction between rural and urban areas at the 
provincial level, also reveal some different impacts for rural versus urban areas. Poor urban 
households seem to benefit more from trade liberalisation than poor rural households. 
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APPENDIX A: SELECTION MODELS 
 
Table A.1:  Estimated parameters of the selection models for single women 
   Unemployed  Subsistence agriculture  Informal sector  Formal sector 
















Coloured  0.239 0.360  -0.508 0.530  -0.466 0.071  1.003 0.000 
Asian  -0.222 0.565  (dropped)  0.000  -1.699 0.001  0.497 0.144 
White  -0.330 0.324  (dropped)  0.000  -2.654 0.000  0.558 0.056 
Primary education  -0.070 0.664  0.515 0.212  0.069 0.629  0.099 0.554 
Standard 8  0.014 0.931  -0.033 0.940  -0.170 0.258  0.379 0.028 
Standard 10  0.429 0.010  -1.070 0.013  -0.327 0.040  0.600 0.001 
Tertiary education  0.186 0.519  (dropped)  0.000  -6.260 0.000  0.406 0.131 
Education attendance  -3.371 0.000  -1.336 0.000  -2.094 0.000  -2.238 0.000 
Semi-skilled  0.164 0.012  3.476 0.000  -0.052 0.494  0.601 0.000 
High-skilled  -0.791 0.061  (dropped)  0.000  -0.603 0.174  1.165 0.000 
Age  0.277 0.000  0.023 0.629  0.385 0.000  0.407 0.000 
Age squared/100  -0.421 0.000  -0.063 0.326  -0.462 0.000  -0.506 0.000 
Ability to write  0.439 0.006  -0.370 0.381  0.347 0.013  0.178 0.276 
Afrikaans language  -0.624 0.017  0.039 0.962  0.214 0.404  -0.285 0.274 
English language  -0.840 0.005  (dropped)  0.000  -0.224 0.441  -0.662 0.016 
Agri. Activity  0.220 0.017  3.803 0.000  1.075 0.000  0.192 0.063 
Western Cape  0.293 0.027  1.607 0.042  0.755 0.000  0.849 0.000 
Eastern Cape  -0.150 0.130  -0.382 0.495  0.082 0.476  -0.185 0.098 
Northern Cape  -0.172 0.256  0.917 0.324  0.299 0.080  -0.207 0.218 
Freestate  -0.024 0.829  0.620 0.275  -0.155 0.235  0.444 0.000 
Kwazulu-Natal  0.035 0.697  0.603 0.263  0.250 0.015  0.350 0.000 
North-West  -0.194 0.051  -1.766 0.047  -0.158 0.178  -0.253 0.026 
Mpumalanga  0.240 0.026  0.195 0.733  0.359 0.004  0.467 0.000 
Limpopo  -0.238 0.043  -1.414 0.016  -0.262 0.050  0.062 0.631 
Urban location  0.648 0.000  -0.360 0.181  0.279 0.000  0.072 0.315 
Homeland location  -0.206 0.004  0.446 0.031  -0.330 0.000  -0.425 0.000 
Children (number)  -0.084 0.001  -0.060 0.356  0.188 0.000  0.085 0.005 
Household size  0.047 0.000  0.021 0.587  -0.168 0.000  -0.101 0.000 
Children 0-1 yr old  -0.297 0.005  0.248 0.454  -0.793 0.000  -0.735 0.000 
Children 1-3 yrs old  0.090 0.312  0.192 0.504  -0.531 0.000  -0.457 0.000 
Children 4-5 yrs old  -0.229 0.023  -0.027 0.932  -0.556 0.000  -0.431 0.000 
Children 6-9 yrs old  -0.120 0.195  0.372 0.197  -0.516 0.000  -0.394 0.000 
Children 9-15 yrs old  -0.009 0.927  -0.405 0.230  -0.365 0.000  -0.265 0.008 
Disability grant in the hh  0.177  0.076 -0.702  0.036 -0.550 0.001  -0.269 0.043 
OAP  in  the  hh  -0.084 0.157  0.201 0.218  -0.723 0.000  -0.493 0.000 
Family allow. in the hh  0.289  0.006  -0.614  0.084  0.090  0.499  -0.076  0.567 
Capital income**  -0.002 0.578  -0.073 0.126  0.003 0.243  -0.009 0.074 
Gov. transfers to the hh**  0.009  0.085  -0.002  0.852  -0.072  0.002  -0.019  0.124 
Predicted inactive inc.*  4.57E-05 0.000  4.57E-05 0.000  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. informal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000 (dropped)  0.000  4.57E-05  0.000 (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. formal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped) 0.000  (dropped) 0.000  4.57E-05  0.000 
Constant  -5.267 0.000  -6.575 0.000  -7.127 0.000  -8.400 0.000 
Note: *in Rand per year  **in 1000’s Rand per year 
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Table A.2:  Estimated parameters of the selection models for married women 
   Unemployed  Subsistence agriculture  Informal sector  Formal sector 
















Coloured  -0.618 0.022  1.093 0.365  -0.738 0.001  0.141 0.514 
Asian  -1.440 0.000  (dropped)  0.000  -2.312 0.000  -0.718 0.004 
White  -1.267 0.000  0.533 0.669  -2.609 0.000  -0.917 0.000 
Primary education  0.113 0.530  1.643 0.000  0.172 0.202  -0.077 0.657 
Standard 8  0.228 0.226  1.122 0.013  -0.072 0.626  0.089 0.617 
Standard 10  0.353 0.077  -0.549 0.271  -0.183 0.269  0.355 0.058 
Tertiary education  0.203 0.587  0.161 0.892  -1.679 0.000  0.523 0.043 
Education attendance  -1.401 0.000  -0.435 0.359  -0.712 0.001  -0.267 0.065 
Semi-skilled  0.107 0.210  4.740 0.000  0.160 0.041  0.535 0.000 
High-skilled  0.482 0.113  (dropped)  0.000  0.701 0.013  0.872 0.000 
Age  0.164 0.000  0.065 0.291  0.180 0.000  0.275 0.000 
Age squared/100  -0.266 0.000  -0.095 0.208  -0.207 0.000  -0.339 0.000 
Ability to write  0.001 0.996  -1.664 0.000  -0.102 0.445  0.186 0.292 
Afrikaans language  -0.401 0.131  -2.596 0.035  0.220 0.320  0.176 0.411 
English language  -0.563 0.060  -2.584 0.031  -0.018 0.945  -0.180 0.418 
Agri. Activity  -0.303 0.005  2.737 0.000  0.740 0.000  -0.150 0.128 
Western Cape  -0.466 0.004  1.233 0.081  0.015 0.918  0.314 0.008 
Eastern Cape  -0.476 0.000  0.441 0.403  -0.360 0.004  0.016 0.889 
Northern Cape  -0.418 0.025  0.090 0.923  0.026 0.870  -0.228 0.117 
Freestate  -0.140 0.259  0.610 0.258  -0.021 0.862  0.277 0.021 
Kwazulu-Natal  -0.357 0.003  0.616 0.227  -0.207 0.072  0.172 0.107 
North-West  -0.401 0.001  -0.195 0.741  -0.483 0.000  -0.193 0.097 
Mpumalanga  0.101 0.418  0.686 0.191  -0.036 0.772  0.067 0.599 
Limpopo  -0.331 0.016  -0.751 0.168  -0.633 0.000  0.045 0.726 
Urban location  0.618 0.000  -1.148 0.000  -0.058 0.421  -0.090 0.212 
Homeland location  -0.155 0.101  -0.437 0.047  -0.333 0.000  -0.569 0.000 
Children (number)  -0.152 0.000  -0.151 0.077  -0.073 0.037  -0.190 0.000 
Household size  0.079 0.000  -0.022 0.675  0.013 0.508  0.020 0.341 
Children 0-1 yr old  -0.406 0.003  0.198 0.574  -0.569 0.000  -0.077 0.548 
Children 1-3 yrs old  -0.039 0.730  -0.026 0.933  -0.340 0.001  0.011 0.916 
Children 4-5 yrs old  -0.149 0.239  -0.116 0.721  -0.333 0.004  -0.042 0.716 
Children 6-9 yrs old  0.056 0.631  0.385 0.197  -0.119 0.244  0.243 0.018 
Children 9-15 yrs old  0.054 0.662  -0.161 0.605  -0.157 0.137  0.025 0.807 
OAP  in  the  hh  0.082 0.477  -0.293 0.229  -0.465 0.000  -0.133 0.230 
Family allow. in the hh  0.241  0.218  0.563  0.131  0.223  0.190  -0.086  0.688 
Capital income**  -0.014 0.029  -0.169 0.001  -0.002 0.024  -0.005 0.002 
Gov. transfers to the hh**  -0.031  0.049  0.008  0.811  -0.020  0.172  -0.065  0.000 
Partner live here  0.840 0.002  0.893 0.152  0.500 0.036  1.190 0.000 
Primary education (partner)  0.195 0.118  -0.015 0.951  -0.014 0.875  0.027 0.815 
Standard 8 (partner)  0.147 0.268  -0.240 0.424  -0.239 0.025  0.000 0.999 
Standard 10 (partner)  0.185 0.205  0.174 0.647  -0.580 0.000  -0.064 0.630 
Tertiary education (partner)  -0.084 0.760  1.297 0.113  -0.879 0.006  -0.124 0.489 
Age (partner)  -0.019 0.000  -0.013 0.254  -0.014 0.002  -0.026 0.000 
Semi-skilled (partner)  -0.226 0.220  -0.767 0.242  -0.031 0.865  0.169 0.134 
High-skilled (partner)  0.048 0.553  0.255 0.185  0.307 0.000  0.062 0.382 
Predicted inactive inc.*  4.08E-05 0.000  4.08E-05 0.000  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. informal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000 (dropped)  0.000  4.08E-05  0.000 (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. formal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped) 0.000  (dropped) 0.000  4.08E-05  0.000 
Constant  -3.394 0.000  -7.189 0.000  -3.675 0.000  -6.719 0.000 
Note: *in Rand per year  **in 1000’s Rand per year 
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Table A.3:  Estimated parameters of the selection models for single men 
   Unemployed  Subsistence agriculture  Informal sector  Formal sector 
















Coloured  -0.389 0.144  -0.978 0.127  -0.263 0.421  0.125 0.615 
Asian  -0.176 0.644  -0.448 0.667  -1.048 0.095  -0.057 0.867 
White  -1.117 0.000  -0.847 0.247  -2.287 0.000  -0.790 0.005 
Primary education  -0.121 0.460  0.171 0.669  0.030 0.876  -0.128 0.452 
Standard 8  0.156 0.356  -0.183 0.669  -0.024 0.908  -0.194 0.276 
Standard 10  0.351 0.041  -1.972 0.000  -0.583 0.005  0.020 0.912 
Tertiary education  0.687 0.012  -1.744 0.039  -1.604 0.000  -0.118 0.664 
Education attendance  -3.929 0.000  -1.728 0.000  -2.562 0.000  -3.206 0.000 
Semi-skilled  0.154 0.037  3.885 0.000  1.256 0.000  0.595 0.000 
High-skilled  0.050 0.875  (dropped)  0.000  1.350 0.000  0.810 0.002 
Age  0.216 0.000  0.039 0.317  0.231 0.000  0.294 0.000 
Age squared/100  -0.324 0.000  -0.056 0.276  -0.287 0.000  -0.396 0.000 
Ability to write  0.632 0.000  -0.075 0.839  0.196 0.285  0.357 0.029 
Afrikaans language  0.200 0.450  1.364 0.029  0.882 0.007  0.515 0.039 
English language  -0.078 0.800  (dropped)  0.000  -0.519 0.220  0.318 0.243 
Agri. Activity  0.102 0.323  2.546 0.000  1.100 0.000  -0.426 0.001 
Western Cape  0.033 0.811  0.816 0.120  0.142 0.435  0.666 0.000 
Eastern Cape  -0.098 0.352  0.261 0.504  -0.175 0.229  -0.215 0.066 
Northern Cape  0.224 0.175  1.392 0.009  -0.081 0.714  0.414 0.012 
Freestate  0.178 0.131  1.047 0.008  0.018 0.914  -0.138 0.296 
Kwazulu-Natal  0.058 0.541  0.576 0.125  -0.142 0.282  0.069 0.503 
North-West  -0.126 0.230  0.183 0.663  -0.377 0.009  -0.389 0.001 
Mpumalanga  0.419 0.000  0.504 0.226  0.496 0.002  0.526 0.000 
Limpopo  -0.135 0.275  -0.276 0.520  -0.407 0.015  -0.023 0.869 
Urban location  0.336 0.000  -0.005 0.982  -0.148 0.104  -0.502 0.000 
Homeland location  -0.307 0.000  0.238 0.228  -0.201 0.048  -1.156 0.000 
Household size  -0.022 0.253  -0.012 0.829  -0.295 0.000  -0.246 0.000 
Number of male  0.045 0.067  -0.030 0.656  0.054 0.173  0.068 0.026 
Children (number)  -0.025 0.379  0.026 0.732  0.256 0.000  0.182 0.000 
Children 0-1 yr old  0.019 0.888  0.365 0.270  -0.013 0.946  -0.104 0.498 
Children 1-3 yrs old  0.019 0.850  0.234 0.382  -0.383 0.011  -0.514 0.000 
Children 4-5 yrs old  -0.051 0.642  0.159 0.580  -0.391 0.015  -0.516 0.000 
Children 6-9 yrs old  -0.195 0.036  0.041 0.865  -0.630 0.000  -0.774 0.000 
Children 9-15 yrs old  -0.095 0.298  -0.549 0.036  -0.609 0.000  -0.493 0.000 
Disability grant in the hh  0.174  0.124 0.544  0.067 0.445  0.017 -0.107  0.472 
OAP  in  the  hh  -0.105 0.104  0.400 0.051  -0.164 0.197  -0.461 0.000 
Family allow. in the hh  0.175  0.160  0.411  0.216  0.326  0.085  -0.233  0.168 
Capital income**  -0.007 0.198  -0.024 0.390  0.000 0.783  -0.013 0.003 
Gov. transfers to the hh**  0.008  0.521  -0.105  0.155  -0.253  0.000  -0.142  0.000 
Predicted inactive inc.*  4.90E-05 0.000  4.90E-05 0.000  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. informal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000 (dropped)  0.000  4.90E-05  0.000 (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. formal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped) 0.000  (dropped) 0.000  4.90E-05  0.000 
Constant  -3.821 0.000  -5.725 0.000  -3.964 0.000  -4.019 0.000 
Note: *in Rand per year  **in 1000’s Rand per year 
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Table A.4:  Estimated parameters of the selection models for married men 
   Unemployed  Subsistence agriculture  Informal sector  Formal sector 
















Coloured  0.250 0.565  1.578 0.230  0.314 0.390  0.471 0.142 
Asian  0.359 0.517  (dropped)  0.000  1.162 0.018  0.606 0.133 
White  -1.045 0.039  -0.494 0.748  -1.118 0.006  -0.226 0.499 
Primary education  0.330 0.152  -0.089 0.818  -0.089 0.627  -0.090 0.592 
Standard 8  0.400 0.106  -0.552 0.212  -0.307 0.127  -0.086 0.641 
Standard 10  0.422 0.126  -0.780 0.090  -0.653 0.005  0.094 0.651 
Tertiary education  0.208 0.643  (dropped)  0.000  -1.718 0.000  -0.244 0.401 
Education attendance  -0.719 0.113  (dropped)  0.000  -1.703 0.000  0.036 0.899 
Semi-skilled  0.084 0.527  4.725 0.000  0.934 0.000  0.450 0.000 
High-skilled  -0.233 0.424  (dropped)  0.000  -0.074 0.753  0.419 0.024 
Age  0.309 0.000  0.147 0.043  0.164 0.000  0.271 0.000 
Age squared/100  -0.395 0.000  -0.211 0.008  -0.219 0.000  -0.341 0.000 
Ability to write  0.014 0.953  -0.316 0.423  0.052 0.777  0.206 0.227 
Afrikaans language  -0.749 0.082  -1.177 0.385  -0.269 0.453  -0.233 0.456 
English language  -0.405 0.404  -1.725 0.234  -1.493 0.000  -0.239 0.487 
Agri. Activity  -0.245 0.119  2.055 0.000  0.512 0.000  -0.306 0.008 
Western Cape  -0.405 0.118  0.417 0.551  -0.131 0.554  0.143 0.461 
Eastern Cape  -0.403 0.047  -0.334 0.530  -0.393 0.027  -0.379 0.017 
Northern Cape  0.118 0.697  -1.542 0.187  -0.162 0.545  0.170 0.471 
Freestate  -0.039 0.861  0.752 0.150  -0.187 0.359  0.431 0.017 
Kwazulu-Natal  -0.236 0.214  -0.341 0.509  -0.480 0.005  -0.216 0.153 
North-West  -0.121 0.569  -0.327 0.567  -0.395 0.039  0.063 0.711 
Mpumalanga  -0.008 0.973  -0.336 0.567  0.030 0.880  0.521 0.004 
Limpopo  -0.242 0.287  -0.549 0.318  -0.267 0.171  0.041 0.817 
Urban location  0.133 0.318  -0.845 0.004  -0.425 0.000  -0.572 0.000 
Homeland location  -0.525 0.000  -0.412 0.149  -0.521 0.000  -1.264 0.000 
Household size  0.009 0.828  -0.152 0.074  -0.148 0.000  -0.174 0.000 
Number of male  0.036 0.503  0.074 0.488  0.057 0.237  0.060 0.161 
Children (number)  -0.129 0.030  -0.075 0.513  0.040 0.452  0.058 0.218 
Children 0-1 yr old  0.559 0.019  1.000 0.038  0.305 0.154  0.426 0.028 
Children 1-3 yrs old  0.376 0.049  0.721 0.068  0.168 0.319  0.164 0.280 
Children 4-5 yrs old  0.358 0.095  0.960 0.023  0.148 0.432  0.197 0.243 
Children 6-9 yrs old  0.213 0.260  0.631 0.096  0.058 0.722  0.052 0.721 
Children 9-15 yrs old  0.210 0.278  0.684 0.069  0.089 0.589  0.061 0.674 
OAP  in  the  hh  -0.067 0.671  0.192 0.533  -0.564 0.000  -0.627 0.000 
Family allow. in the hh  0.129  0.604  0.611  0.147  -0.169  0.462  -0.681  0.002 
Capital income**  0.000 0.726  -0.001 0.523  -0.001 0.169  -0.005 0.000 
Gov. transfers to the hh**  -0.001  0.936  -0.029  0.578  -0.132  0.000  -0.120  0.000 
Partner live here  1.484 0.001  0.214 0.787  1.440 0.000  0.929 0.005 
Primary education (partner)  0.207 0.274  -0.011 0.972  -0.029 0.844  0.128 0.356 
Standard 8 (partner)  0.021 0.919  -0.356 0.330  -0.279 0.095  -0.118 0.447 
Standard 10 (partner)  0.093 0.707  -0.774 0.104  -0.292 0.160  0.101 0.592 
Tertiary education (partner)  0.308 0.588  -0.368 0.814  0.284 0.535  0.750 0.049 
Age (partner)  -0.034 0.000  -0.015 0.350  -0.030 0.000  -0.034 0.000 
Semi-skilled (partner)  -0.507 0.232  -0.911 0.552  -0.595 0.092  -0.792 0.005 
High-skilled (partner)  -0.261 0.066  0.140 0.552  -0.063 0.602  -0.015 0.890 
Predicted inactive inc.*  2.04E-05 0.000  2.04E-05 0.000  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. informal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000 (dropped)  0.000  2.04E-05  0.000 (dropped)  0.000 
Predic. formal earnings*  (dropped)  0.000  (dropped) 0.000  (dropped) 0.000  2.04E-05  0.000 
Constant  -5.737 0.000  -5.795 0.001  -1.145 0.121  -2.012 0.002 
Note: *in Rand per year  **in 1000’s Rand per year 
 
    
APPENDIX B: REGRESSION MODELS 
 
Table B.1:  Estimated parameters of the regression models for women (log earnings) 
   Single women  Married women 


















Coloured  0.281 0.126  -0.022 0.872  0.504 0.013  -0.008 0.941 
Asian  1.244 0.003  0.028 0.870  1.735 0.000  0.006 0.957 
White  1.724 0.000  0.335 0.021  2.185 0.000  0.347 0.001 
Primary  education  0.016 0.870  -0.097 0.321  -0.007 0.956  -0.282 0.003 
Standard  8  0.253 0.020  0.077 0.444  0.519 0.000  -0.017 0.863 
Standard  10  0.631 0.000  0.442 0.000  0.725 0.000  0.369 0.000 
Tertiary  education  2.404 0.000  0.728 0.000  2.017 0.000  0.545 0.000 
Education  attendance  -0.014 0.925  0.441 0.000  0.488 0.043  0.335 0.000 
Semi-skilled -0.077  0.221  0.210 0.000  -0.262 0.000 0.285  0.000 
High-skilled 0.918  0.001 0.562  0.000 0.103 0.650  0.576 0.000 
Age  0.029 0.080  0.064 0.000  0.045 0.060  0.044 0.005 
Age  squared/100  -0.033 0.117  -0.051 0.001  -0.055 0.060  -0.033 0.093 
Ability to write  0.052  0.602  0.282 0.003  0.256 0.029 0.606  0.000 
Afrikaans  language  -0.153 0.397  0.092 0.504  -0.185 0.346  0.045 0.672 
English  language  0.055 0.761  0.295 0.035  -0.229 0.365  0.169 0.111 
Western  Cape  0.028 0.793  -0.122 0.053  0.047 0.737  -0.090 0.117 
Eastern  Cape  -0.481 0.000  -0.113 0.056  -0.349 0.003  -0.171 0.003 
Northern  Cape  -0.478 0.000  -0.131 0.115  -0.497 0.001  -0.113 0.118 
Freestate  -0.529 0.000  -0.418 0.000  -0.670 0.000  -0.377 0.000 
Kwazulu-Natal  -0.237 0.002  -0.239 0.000  -0.101 0.340  -0.098 0.061 
North-West  -0.145 0.117  -0.056 0.361  0.087 0.460  -0.021 0.729 
Mpumalanga  -0.275 0.003  -0.206 0.002  -0.022 0.848  -0.081 0.223 
Limpopo  0.104 0.307  -0.225 0.001  0.227 0.069  -0.168 0.010 
Urban  location  0.160 0.004  0.292 0.000  0.319 0.000  0.386 0.000 
Homeland  location -0.071 0.267  0.169 0.000  0.090 0.262  0.251 0.000 
Agri.  Activity  -1.078 0.000  -0.225 0.000  -0.991 0.000  0.049 0.408 
Inverse Mills ratios  -0.811  0.000  -0.404 0.000  -1.184 0.000 -0.368  0.000 
Constant  8.939 0.000  7.842 0.000  8.717 0.000  7.964 0.000 
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Table B.2:  Estimated parameters of the regression models for men (log earnings) 
   Single men  Married men 


















Coloured  0.193 0.492  0.064 0.542  0.324 0.101  0.015 0.832 
Asian  0.821 0.147  0.265 0.046  0.154 0.642  0.092 0.262 
White  1.523 0.000  0.710 0.000  1.174 0.000  0.721 0.000 
Primary  education  -0.252 0.119  -0.006 0.946  -0.019 0.863  0.080 0.074 
Standard  8  -0.176 0.310  0.206 0.016  0.313 0.012  0.300 0.000 
Standard  10  0.305 0.094  0.460 0.000  0.674 0.000  0.575 0.000 
Tertiary  education  0.717 0.119  0.682 0.000  0.928 0.002  0.824 0.000 
Education  attendance  0.037 0.826  0.307 0.000  0.658 0.105  0.301 0.000 
Semi-skilled -0.750  0.000  0.133 0.000  -0.341 0.000 0.165  0.000 
High-skilled 0.102  0.687 0.687  0.000 0.924 0.000  0.462 0.000 
Age  0.048 0.009  0.083 0.000  0.053 0.014  0.090 0.000 
Age  squared/100  -0.062 0.010  -0.085 0.000  -0.059 0.017  -0.087 0.000 
Ability to write  0.474  0.003  0.221 0.005  0.236 0.036 0.201  0.000 
Afrikaans  language  -0.153 0.588  0.088 0.395  -0.071 0.726  -0.015 0.825 
English  language  0.512 0.131  0.098 0.372  0.406 0.131  0.169 0.020 
Western  Cape  0.204 0.244  -0.162 0.003  -0.059 0.685  -0.046 0.231 
Eastern  Cape  -0.526 0.000  -0.169 0.002  -0.483 0.000  -0.161 0.000 
Northern  Cape  0.049 0.812  -0.360 0.000  -0.301 0.077  -0.054 0.236 
Freestate  -0.516 0.001  -0.226 0.000  -0.536 0.000  -0.135 0.000 
Kwazulu-Natal  0.195 0.102  -0.091 0.043  -0.138 0.230  -0.083 0.015 
North-West  0.200 0.144  0.153 0.003  -0.015 0.905  0.086 0.017 
Mpumalanga  -0.102 0.467  -0.085 0.140  -0.048 0.696  -0.036 0.348 
Limpopo  0.351 0.021  -0.273 0.000  -0.084 0.506  -0.033 0.438 
Urban  location  0.297 0.000  0.387 0.000  0.242 0.001  0.330 0.000 
Homeland  location -0.349 0.000  0.192 0.000  -0.088 0.326  0.205 0.000 
Agri.  Activity  -1.166 0.000  0.083 0.263  -0.551 0.000  -0.068 0.056 
Inverse Mills ratios  -0.787  0.000  -0.271 0.000  -0.267 0.200 -0.537  0.000 
Constant  9.024 0.000  7.482 0.000  8.145 0.000  7.486 0.000 
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table C.1:  Summary statistics by demographic group (weighted mean) 
   Single women  Married women  Single men  Married men 
Black  0.85 0.67  0.84  0.66 
Coloured  0.09 0.11  0.08  0.11 
Asian  0.02 0.05  0.02  0.05 
White  0.05 0.17  0.06  0.18 
No education & pre-school  0.07 0.10  0.05  0.10 
Primary education  0.22 0.27  0.24  0.27 
Standard 8  0.29 0.27  0.29  0.25 
Standard 10  0.39 0.31  0.38  0.29 
Tertiary education  0.03 0.05  0.03  0.08 
Education attendance  0.17 0.03  0.19  0.03 
Low-skilled  0.59 0.53  0.65  0.59 
Semi-skilled  0.38 0.42  0.32  0.29 
High-skilled  0.02 0.06  0.03  0.12 
Age squared/100  10.50 15.11  8.72  18.26 
Ability to write  0.93 0.90  0.94  0.91 
Afrikaans language  0.10 0.19  0.10  0.20 
English language  0.06 0.14  0.06  0.15 
Indigenous  0.84 0.67  0.84  0.66 
Agri. Activity  0.13 0.17  0.11  0.11 
Western Cape  0.08 0.12  0.08  0.13 
Eastern Cape  0.15 0.13  0.15  0.10 
Northern Cape  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.02 
Freestate  0.06 0.07  0.06  0.08 
Kwazulu-Natal  0.24 0.18  0.22  0.17 
North-West  0.09 0.07  0.09  0.08 
Gauteng  0.19 0.21  0.20  0.27 
Mpumalanga  0.07 0.07  0.06  0.07 
Limpopo  0.11 0.12  0.11  0.09 
Urban location  0.59 0.62  0.58  0.68 
Homeland location  0.34 0.29  0.33  0.20 
Household size  5.87 4.82  5.40  4.30 
Number of male  2.24 2.30  3.08  2.22 
Children (number)  1.96 1.72  1.40  1.38 
Children 0-1 yr old  0.12 0.11  0.06  0.09 
Children 1-3 yrs old  0.25 0.24  0.16  0.20 
Children 4-5 yrs old  0.11 0.12  0.09  0.10 
Children 6-9 yrs old  0.14 0.15  0.13  0.13 
Children 9-15 yrs old  0.11 0.11  0.12  0.10 
OAP in the hh  0.23  0.10  0.24  0.07 
Family allow. in the hh  0.05  0.02  0.04  0.02 
Capital income/1000**  1.07 4.05  1.32  4.07 
Gov. transfers to the hh**  0.92  0.67  0.86  0.59 
Partner live here  2.00 0.84  2.00  0.85 
No education & pre-school (partner)  0.00 0.09  0.00  0.07 
Primary education (partner)  0.00 0.21  0.00  0.21 
Standard 8 (partner)  0.00 0.21  0.00  0.23 
Standard 10 (partner)  0.00 0.25  0.00  0.30 
Tertiary education (partner)  0.00 0.07  0.00  0.05 
Age (partner)  0.00 35.93  0.00  31.99 
Low-skilled (partner)  0.00 0.48  0.00  0.42 
Semi-skilled (partner)  0.00 0.10  0.00  0.06 
High-skilled (partner)  0.00 0.25  0.00  0.37 
Predicted inactive inc.*  1,050 961  842  449 
Predic. informal earnings*  9,299 11,633  9,361  32,320 
Predic. formal earnings*  16,353 23,598  18,920  41,511 
Note: *in Rand per year  **in 1000’s Rand per year 
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